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We derive a general optimal income tax formula when individuals respond along both the 
intensive and extensive margins and when income effects can prevail. Individuals are 
heterogeneous across two dimensions: their skill and their disutility of participation. Prefer-
ences over consumption and work effort can differ with respect to the level of skill, with only 
the Spence-Mirrlees condition being imposed. Employing a new tax perturbation approach 
that integrates the nonlinearity of the tax function into the behavioral elasticities, we derive a 
fairly mild condition for optimal marginal tax rates to be nonnegative everywhere. Numerical 
simulations using U.S. data confirm the mildness of our conditions. The extensive margin 
strongly reduces the level of optimal marginal tax rates. 
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When labor supply is modeled along the intensive (in-work e⁄ort) margin only, the theory
of optimal income taxation recommends that the marginal tax rates be almost everywhere
positive.1 When individuals respond along both the intensive and extensive (participation)
margins, negative participation tax rates2 may prevail as numerically derived in the seminal
contribution by Saez (2002). As a ￿rst contribution, we provide analytical results about the
sign of optimal marginal tax rates in a model with both the intensive and extensive margins.
This paper analytically derives a fairly mild su¢ cient condition under which optimal marginal
tax rates are almost everywhere positive.
For this purpose, we consider an economy where individuals are heterogeneously endowed
with two unobserved characteristics: their skill level and disutility of participation. Because
of the former heterogeneity, employed workers typically choose di⁄erent earnings levels, while
because of the latter heterogeneity, at any skill level, only some individuals choose to work.
The government then faces a multidimensional screening problem of the ￿random participation￿
type (Rochet and Stole (2002)). It can only condition taxation on endogenous earnings and not
on the exogenous characteristics whose heterogeneity in the population lies at the origin of the
redistribution problem.
We show that optimal marginal tax rates are nonnegative if the ratio of one minus the social
welfare weight to the extensive behavioral response increases along the skill distribution. If the
intensive margin is shut down, the optimal equity-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄ equalizes the participation
tax to this ratio at each skill level. If this ratio is increasing in the skill level, so does the
participation tax. If now the intensive margin is taken into account, positive marginal tax rates
distort intensive responses downwards. Consequently, the optimal equity-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄
takes this additional distortion into account and opts for lower but still positive marginal tax
rates (except at the two extremes of the skill distribution). While our su¢ cient condition is
expressed in terms of endogenous variables, we discuss its relevance in practice and provide
examples of speci￿cations on primitives where this condition holds. For instance, when the
government has a Maximin objective, the restrictions imposed by our su¢ cient condition are
fairly weak.
In order to derive the condition that ensures positive marginal tax rates, this paper introduces
a new method to sign the distortions along the intensive margin in any screening model with
random participation. This technique consists in showing that the restrictions on primitives that
ensure positive marginal (or both positive marginal and participation) tax rates in the model
1See, e.g., Mirrlees (1971), Sadka (1976), Seade (1982), Werning (2000) or Hellwig (2007). See however the
counterexamples of ChonØ and Laroque (2009b).
2The participation tax rate equals the tax level plus the bene￿t for the nonemployed.
1with extensive margin only also guarantee positive marginal (or both positive marginal and
participation) tax rates in the model with both intensive and extensive margins. This technique
can be directly applied in other contexts of monopoly screening with random participation (e.g.,
the nonlinear pricing model of Rochet and Stole (2002). There the intensive margin distortions
correspond to the quantities of product that are bought) and constitutes the second contribution
of our paper.
Since Mirrlees (1971), the optimal tax problem is usually solved by searching for the best
incentive-compatible allocation using optimal control. While this method has proved successful,
it lacks economic intuition. A natural alternative consists in computing the e⁄ects of a per-
turbation in the optimal tax schedule. However, this ￿tax perturbation￿approach is not often
adopted, one reason being the following ￿circular process￿ : Due to the nonlinearity of the tax
schedule, when labor supply responds to a tax perturbation, the induced change in gross income
a⁄ects in turn the marginal tax rate, thereby generating a further labor supply response. Our
third contribution is to directly derive the optimal tax formula thanks to a new tax perturbation
approach by de￿ning behavioral elasticities in a way that integrates this circular process. We
express optimal marginal rates as a function of the social welfare weights, the skill distribution
and the behavioral elasticities. Our decomposition generalizes previous results by allowing for
income e⁄ects and extensive margin responses. We verify that the Mirrleesian approach leads
to the same formula.
In the presence of income e⁄ects, the literature has established that the optimal marginal tax
rates are ceteris paribus increasing in the uncompensated elasticity of the labor supply, which
can be puzzling (see, for instance, Equation (25) in Saez (2001)). We show that marginal tax
rates are actually increasing in the elasticity of gross income with respect to the skill level since
the distribution of earnings is more unequal when this elasticity is larger. The latter elasticity
equals one plus the uncompensated elasticity of the labor supply only when preferences over
consumption and in-work e⁄ort are homogeneous and when gross income is the product of the
intensive in-work e⁄ort times the skill level. Our fourth contribution is to clarify this point by
relaxing these usual assumptions, keeping only the Spence-Mirrlees restriction.
Finally, using U.S. data, we check whether our su¢ cient condition for nonnegative marginal
tax rates is empirically reasonable and we illustrate the quantitative implications of our optimal
tax formula. We ￿nd that marginal tax rates are always positive and that our su¢ cient condition
is largely satis￿ed. Moreover, the standard U-shape pro￿le obtained in the Mirrlees model is
still valid when both margins are considered. However, introducing the extensive margin has a
quantitatively important impact. In our benchmark simulation, the mean of the marginal tax
rates between 0 and $100;000 per year is reduced by 11:3 percentage points under the Benthamite
criterion and by 36:5 percentage points under Maximin when the extensive margin is introduced.
2We also ￿nd that, for the least skilled workers, participation taxes are typically negative under
the Benthamite criterion, while they are always positive under Maximin.3 Under Benthamite
preferences, with a strictly positive lower bound for the earnings distribution, our simulations
show a negative participation tax rate at this minimum (as for the EITC) and positive marginal
tax rates (as for the NIT). In such case, the optimal tax schedule is a third way between NIT
and EITC with negative participation taxes at the low end of the skill distribution and positive
marginal tax rates everywhere.4
For many years following Mirrlees￿(1971) seminal work, the various theoretical developments
focused on useful technical re￿nements but provided little economic intuitions. The ￿rst impor-
tant advance was made when Atkinson (1990), Piketty (1997) and Diamond (1998) reexpressed
optimality conditions derived from the Mirrlees model in terms of behavioral elasticities in the
absence of income e⁄ects. Saez (2001) provided a second important advance by deriving an
optimal tax formula using the tax perturbation approach.5 He took into account the above-
mentioned ￿circular process￿by expressing the optimal tax formula in terms of the unappealing
notion of a￿virtual￿ 6 earnings distribution and veri￿ed the consistency of his solution with that
in Mirrlees (1971). Further, Saez (2001) allowed for income e⁄ects. In this study, we avoid the
use of virtual densities because of our rede￿nition of the behavioral elasticities.
The above-mentioned studies neglected labor supply responses along the extensive margin,
while the empirical labor supply literature emphasizes that labor supply responses along the
extensive margin are much more important (see, e.g., Heckman (1993)). Saez (2002) derived an
optimal tax formula in an economy with both intensive and extensive margins. Saez (2002) fo-
cused on the EITC/NIT debate about whether the working poor should receive greater transfers
than nonemployed individuals (i.e. about the sign of the participation tax at the bottom), while
we discuss the conditions under which marginal tax rates should be nonnegative. Moreover,
our formula allows for income e⁄ects.7 He developed a model where agents choose from a ￿nite
3The literature on optimal taxation in the pure extensive model has typically found the latter (e.g. ChonØ
and Laroque (2005)). The optimality of a negative participation tax at the bottom of the earnings distribution is
interpreted as a case for an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) rather than an Negative Income Tax (NIT) (see
Saez (2002)).
4We assume a strictly positive minimum for the skill distribution. Hence, a negative participation tax rate at
the bottom implies negative marginal tax rates only for earnings levels below the one chosen by the least skilled
workers. The marginal tax rates that are e⁄ectively applied are therefore nonnegative.
5Christiansen (1981) ￿rst introduced the tax perturbation approach. However, he did not derive any implica-
tions for the optimal income tax, his focus being instead on the optimal provision of public goods and the structure
of commodity taxation. Revecz (1989) also proposed a method to derive an optimal income tax formula in terms
of elasticities but did not consider the above-mentioned circular process. Hence, his solution was inconsistent with
Mirrlees (1971) (see Revecz (2003) and Saez (2003)). Using a tax perturbation method, Piketty (1997) derived
the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule under Maximin. However, he too neglected to take into account the
circular process, though this had no consequence as he assumed away the income e⁄ects. Roberts (2000) derived
an optimal tax formula under Benthamite preferences.
6Saez (2001, p.215) de￿nes the virtual density at earnings level z as ￿the density of incomes that would take
place at z if the tax schedule T (:) were replaced by the linear tax schedule tangent to T (:) at level z￿ .
7The formal model in the appendix in Saez (2002) allows for the possibility of income e⁄ects. Moreover, the
3set of occupations, each associated with an exogenous level of earnings. We treat the intensive
margin in a continuous way, which we think is more appropriate for the study of marginal tax
rates.
Kleven and Kreiner (2006) consider a model with both margins. Their model as ours exhibits
a bi-dimensional heterogeneity. However, we allow preferences between consumption and work
e⁄ort to di⁄er across skill levels. Moreover, they focus on the computation of the marginal
cost of public funds, while we are interested in the design of the optimal income tax schedule.
Immervoll et alii (2007) calibrate a model similar to Kleven and Kreiner (2006) on 15 European
countries to compute the e⁄ects of two prototypical tax reforms. Kleven, Kreiner and Saez
(2009) investigate the optimal taxation of couples in a model where primary earners respond
along their intensive margin and their spouse respond along their extensive margin. Secondary
earners are equally productive but have heterogeneous opportunity cost of work. Kleven, Kreiner
and Saez investigate whether the tax rate on one person should depend on the earnings of the
spouse. Finally, Boone and Bovenberg (2004) introduce search decisions in the Mirrlees model.
Their speci￿cation of the search technology implies that any individual with a skill level above
(below) an endogenous threshold searches at the maximum intensity (does not search).
Section II presents the model. Section III derives the optimal tax formula in terms of behav-
ioral elasticities using the tax perturbation method. This section also compares the obtained
tax formula with the existing literature. Section IV provides a su¢ cient condition to ensure
nonnegative optimal marginal tax rates and gives examples where this condition is satis￿ed.
Section V presents the simulations for the U.S. In the appendix, we develop the formal model.
In particular, we solve for the optimal allocations using the typical optimal control approach.
We then verify that this solution is consistent with that derived in the main body of the text.
II The model
II.1 Individuals
Each individual derives utility from consumption C and disutility from labor supply or e⁄ort
L. More e⁄ort implies higher earnings Y , the relationship between the two also depends on the
individual￿ s skill endowment w. The literature typically assumes that Y = w ￿ L. To avoid
this unnecessary restriction on the technology, we express individuals￿preferences in terms of
the observables (C and Y ) and the individuals￿exogenous characteristics (particularly w). This
also enables us to consider cases where the preferences over consumption C and e⁄ort L are skill
dependent. The skill endowments are exogenous, heterogeneous and unobserved by government.
Hence, consumption C is related to earnings Y through the tax function C = Y ￿ T (Y ).
appendix in Saez (2000) (the NBER version of Saez (2002)) extends his optimal tax formula with both extensive
and intensive responses to the case of a continuum of earnings but still without income e⁄ects.
4The empirical literature has emphasized that a signi￿cant part of the labor supply responses
to tax reforms are concentrated along the extensive margin. We integrate this feature by con-
sidering a speci￿c disutility of participation, which makes a di⁄erence in the level of utility only
between workers (for whom Y > 0) and the nonemployed (for whom Y = 0). This disutility
may arise from commuting, job-search e⁄ort, or the reduced amount of time available for home
production. However, for some people, employment has a value per se, as at least some enjoy
working (see, e.g., Polachek and Siebert (1993, p. 101)). Some individuals would even feel stig-
matized if they had no job. Let ￿ denote an individual￿ s disutility of participation net of this
intrinsic job value. We assume that people are endowed with di⁄erent positive or negative (net)
disutility of participation ￿. As for the skill endowment, ￿ is exogenous and unobserved by the
government. Because of this additional heterogeneity, individuals with the same skill level may
take di⁄erent participation decisions. This is consistent with the observation that in all OECD
countries, skill-speci￿c employment rates always lie inside (0;1).
For tractability, we require that the intensive labor supply decisions Y of individuals that
have chosen to work depend only on their skill and not on their net disutility of participation.
To obtain this simpli￿cation, we need to impose some separability in individuals￿preferences.
We specify the utility function of an individual of type (w;￿) as:
U (C;Y;w) ￿ IY >0 ￿ ￿ (1)
where IY >0 is an indicator variable equal to one if the individual works and zero otherwise.
The gross utility function U (:;:;:) is twice-continuously di⁄erentiable and concave with respect
to (C;Y ). Individuals derive utility from consumption C and disutility from labor supply, so
U0
C > 0 > U0
Y . This utility function allows preferences over C and Y to vary with w. Finally,
we impose the strict-single crossing (Spence-Mirrlees) condition. We assume that, starting from
any positive level of consumption and earnings, more skilled workers need to be compensated
with a smaller increase in their consumption to accept a unit rise in earnings. This implies that
the marginal rate of substitution ￿U0
Y (C;Y;w)=U0
C (C;Y;w) decreases in the skill level. Hence
we have:
U00
Y w (C;Y;w) ￿ U0
C (C;Y;w) ￿ U00
Cw (C;Y;w) ￿ U0
Y (C;Y;w) > 0 (2)
The distribution of skills is described by the density f (:), which is continuous and positive
over the support [w0;w1], with 0 < w0 < w1 ￿ +1. It is worth noting that the lowest
skill is positive. The size of the total population is normalized to 1 so
R w1
w0 f (w)dw = 1. The
distribution of ￿ conditional on the skill level w is described by the conditional density k(:;w) and




￿1 k(x;w)dx. The density k(:;:) is continuously
di⁄erentiable. It is worth noting that we do not assume independence between w and ￿. The
support of the distribution is (￿1;￿max], with ￿max ￿ +1. The assumption about the lower
5bound is made for tractability as it ensures a positive mass of employed individuals at each skill
level.
Each agent solves the following maximization problem:
max
Y
U (Y ￿ T (Y );Y;w) ￿ IY >0 ￿ ￿
where the choice of Y can be decomposed into a participation decision (i.e., Y = 0 or Y > 0) and
an intensive choice (i.e., the value of Y when Y > 0). For a worker of type (w;￿), selecting a





U (Y ￿ T (Y );Y;w) (3)
In particular, two workers with the same skill level but with a di⁄erent disutility of par-
ticipation ￿ face the same intensive choice program, thereby taking the same decisions along
the intensive margin.8 Let Yw be the intensive choice of a worker of skill w, and let Cw be
the corresponding consumption level, so Cw = Yw ￿ T (Yw). The gross utility of workers of
skill w therefore equals Uw = U (Cw;Yw;w). We ignore the non-negativity constraint on Yw
when solving the intensive choice program. We verify in our simulations that the minimum
of the earnings distribution is always positive (given that we assume w0 > 0). Therefore, the
possibility of bunching due to the nonnegativity constraint can be neglected.
We now turn to the participation decisions. Let b = ￿T (0) denote the consumption level for
the nonemployed. We refer to b as the welfare bene￿t. If an individual of type (w;￿) chooses to
work, she obtains utility Uw ￿ ￿. If she chooses not to participate, she obtains U (b;0;w). An
individual of type (w;￿) then chooses to work if ￿ ￿ Uw ￿ U (b;0;w).9 Therefore, the mass of
workers of skill w is given by h(w) de￿ned as:
h(w)
def
￿ K (Uw ￿ U (b;0;w);w) ￿ f (w) (4)
with some abuse of notation as h(w) does not make explicit the dependence of h(:) with respect
to b and Uw. The function h(w) is twice-continuously di⁄erentiable, increasing in Uw and
8The key assumption for this result is that preferences over consumption and earnings for employed agents
vary only with skill and do not depend on the net disutility of participation ￿. Such a property is obtained under









where W is discontinuous at Y = 0, V (:;:;:) is an aggregator increasing in its ￿rst argument, function U (:;:;:)
veri￿es U
0
C > 0 > U
0
Y and (2), function U
0 (:;:;:) describes the preference of the nonemployed and increases in its
￿rst argument, functions U (:;:;:), U
0 (:;:;:) and V (:;:;:) are twice-continuously di⁄erentiable over respectively
R
+ ￿ R
+ ￿ [w0;w1], R
+ ￿ [w0;w1] ￿ R
+ and R ￿ [w0;w1] ￿ (￿1;￿
max], and ￿nally, the assumption that for
given levels of C, Y , w and b, the function ￿ 7! V (U (C;Y;w);w;￿) ￿ U
0 (b;w;￿) is decreasing and admits a
positive limit whenever ￿ tends to ￿1. All results derived in this paper can be obtained under this more general
speci￿cation, the additional di¢ culty being only notational.
9Alternatively, Lorenz and Sachs (2010) introduce an extensive margin by assuming that workers cannot work
less than a minimum working time.
6decreasing in b, with respective derivatives h0
U (w) and h0
b (w) given by
h0
U (w) = k(Uw ￿ U (b;0;w);w)￿f (w) and h0
b (w) = ￿U0
C (b;0;w)￿k(Uw ￿ U (b;0;w);w)￿f (w)
The number of workers of skill less than w is H (w) =
R w
w0 h(n) ￿ dn. There are then H (w1)
employed individuals and 1 ￿ H (w1) nonemployed individuals.
II.2 Behavioral elasticities
We de￿ne the behavioral elasticities from the intensive choice program (3) and the extensive
margin decision (4). When the tax function is di⁄erentiable, (3) implies:






where the derivatives of U (:) are evaluated at (Cw;Yw;w). When the tax function is twice
di⁄erentiable, the second-order condition is:
U00
















CC ￿ T00 (Yw) ￿ U0
C ￿ 0 (6)
As function U (:;:;w) is concave, the second-order condition (6) is satis￿ed when the tax
function is linear or convex or is not ￿too concave￿ .Whenever (6) strictly holds, which we hence-
forth assume throughout the remainder of this section, the ￿rst-order condition (5) implicitly
de￿nes10 earnings Yw as a function of the skill level and the tax function. The elasticity ￿w of
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Let ^ h(Y ) and ^ H (Y ) denote respectively the density and cumulated density function of the
earnings distribution among employed individuals, with @ ^ H (Y )=@Y = ^ h(Y ). For all skill levels,
one has ^ H (Yw) ￿ H (w). From Equation (7), h(w) and ^ h(Yw) are thus related by:
Yw
w
￿ ￿w ￿ ^ h(Yw) ￿ h(w) (8)
If the left-hand side of (6) is nil, then the function Y 7! U (Y ￿ T (Y );Y;w) becomes typically
constant around w. Therefore, individuals of type w are indi⁄erent between a range of earnings
10In addition, one has to assume that among the possible multiple local maxima of Y 7! U (Y ￿ T (Y );Y;w),
a single maximum corresponds to the global maximum. If program Y 7! U (Y ￿ T (Y );Y;w
￿) admits two
global maxima for a skill level w
￿, workers of a skill level w slightly above (below) w
￿ would strictly prefer the
higher (lower) maximum because of the strict single-crossing condition (2). Hence, function w 7! Yw exhibits a
discontinuity at skill w
￿. Moreover, once again through the strict single-crossing condition, function w 7! Yw is
nondecreasing. Therefore, it is discontinuous on a set of skill levels that is at worst countable (and at best empty).
Because the skill distribution is assumed continuous without any mass point, the latter set is of zero measure.
11See Appendix A.
7levels, so the function n 7! Yn becomes discontinuous at skill n = w and program (3) admit
multiple solutions for workers of skill w. The same phenomenon also occurs when the tax
function is downward discontinuous at Yw (T00 (Y ) tends to minus in￿nity, so (6) is violated).
Conversely, bunching of types occurs when ￿w = 0 (i.e. T00 (Y ) tends to plus in￿nity). This
corresponds to a kink in the tax function. From here on, we assume that T(:) is di⁄erentiable
and hence exclude bunching. However, this assumption is relaxed in the appendix, where we
solve the model in terms of incentive-compatible allocations and consider what happens when
bunching takes place.
We now consider di⁄erent elementary tax reforms and compute how they a⁄ect the intensive
(3) and extensive (4) choices. The ￿rst elementary tax reform captures the substitution e⁄ect
around the actual tax schedule. The marginal tax rate T0 (Y ) is decreased by a small amount ￿
over the range of earnings [Yw ￿ ￿;Yw + ￿]. In so doing, the level of tax at earnings level Yw is
kept constant, as is Cw. This reform is illustrated by the left-hand side panel in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
The behavioral response to this reform by a worker of skill w is captured by the compensated































CC ￿ T00 (Yw) ￿ U0
C
￿ > 0 (9)
When the marginal tax rate is decreased by ￿, a unit rise ￿Yw in earnings generates a higher
gain ￿Cw = (1 ￿ T0 (Yw) + ￿)￿Yw of consumption. Therefore, workers substitute earnings for
leisure. Finally, this reform only has a second-order e⁄ect on Uw and thereby on the participation
decisions.13
The next elementary tax reform captures the income e⁄ect around the actual tax schedule.
The level of tax decreases by a small lump sum ￿ over a range in earnings [Yw ￿ ￿;Yw + ￿]. This
reform is illustrated by the right-hand side panel in Figure 1. Along the intensive margin, the

































CC ￿ T00 (Yw) ￿ U0
C
(10)
This term can be either positive or negative. However, when leisure is a normal good, the
numerator is positive; hence, the income e⁄ect (10) is negative.
12The elasticity "w is compensated in the sense that the tax level is unchanged at earnings level Yw.
13Decreasing T
0 (:) by ￿ implies a rise ￿Yw of earnings, which itself increases Cw by ￿Cw =
(1 ￿ T
0 (Yw) + ￿)￿Yw. Therefore the impact on Uw is given by ￿Uw = ￿U (Cw;Yw;w) =
[(1 ￿ T




Y ]￿Yw = U
0
C ￿ ("wYw=(1 ￿ T
0 (Yw))) ￿
2 where the second equality follows (5) and (9)
through ￿Yw = ("wYw=(1 ￿ T
0 (Yw)))￿.
8The ￿￿-reform￿ illustrated by the right-hand side panel in Figure 1 also induces some indi-
viduals of skill w to enter the labor market. We capture this extensive response for individuals















k(Uw ￿ U (b;0;w))
K (Uw ￿ U (b;0;w))
￿ U0
C > 0 (11)
which stands for the percentage of variation in the mass of workers with skill level w. Finally, we
measure the elasticity of participation when, combined with a uniform decrease in the tax level
by ￿, the welfare bene￿t b rises by ￿ (i.e., when T(Y )+b is kept constant). This reform captures
income e⁄ects along the extensive margin. The (endogenous) semi-elasticity of the number of








k(Uw ￿ U (b;0;w))








When the utility function U (:;:;:) is additively separable and concave in consumption and if
Cw > b, U0
C (Cw;Yw;w) is lower than U0
C (b;0;w). Income e⁄ects along the extensive margin are
then negative, which corresponds to the ￿normal￿case.
The behavioral responses given in (7), (9), (10), (11) and (12) are endogenous in that they
depend on the skill level w, the earnings level Y and the tax function T (:). In particular, the
various responses along the intensive margin given in (7), (9) and (10) are standard (see, e.g.,
Saez (2001)), except for the presence of T00 (:) in the denominators. An exogenous increase in
either w, ￿, or ￿ induces a direct change in earnings ￿1Yw. However, this change in turn modi￿es
the marginal tax rate by ￿1T0 = T00 (Yw)￿￿1Yw, thereby inducing a further change in earnings
￿2Yw. Therefore, a ￿circular process￿ takes place: the earnings level determines the marginal
tax rate through the tax function, and the marginal tax rate a⁄ects the earnings level through
the substitution e⁄ect. The term T00 (Yw) ￿ U0
C captures the indirect e⁄ects due to this circular
process (in the words of Saez (2001), see also Saez (2003, p. 483) and Appendix A). Unlike Saez
(2001), we do not de￿ne the behavioral responses along a hypothetical linear tax function, but
along the actual (or later optimal) tax schedule, which we allow to be nonlinear.14 Therefore,
our behavioral response parameters (7), (9) and (10) take into account the circular process and
exhibit the term T00 (:) in their denominators.
II.3 The government




(T (Yw) + b) ￿ h(w) ￿ dw ￿ E (13)
14See also Blomquist and Simula (2010) who calculate the marginal deadweight loss when the income tax is
nonlinear.
9where E is an exogenous amount of public expenditures. For each additional worker of skill w,
the government collects taxes T (Yw) and saves welfare bene￿t b.
Turning now to the government￿ s objective, we adopt a welfarist criterion that sums over
all types of individuals a transformation G(v;w;￿) of individuals￿utility v, with G(:;:;:) twice-
continuously di⁄erentiable and G0











G(U (b;0;w);w;￿) ￿ k(￿;w)d￿
)
f (w)dw
The social transformation function G(:;:;:) depends not only on the utility levels v of individuals,
but also on their exogenous type (w;￿). Our social welfare function generalizes the Bergson-
Samuelson social objective, which does not depend on the individuals￿type. With the latter
criterion, the preferences for redistribution would be induced by the concavity of G(:); that
is, by G00
vv < 0. Our speci￿cation also encompasses the case where function G(:;:;:) equals a
type-speci￿c exogenous weight times the individuals￿level of utility. The government￿ s desire to
compensate for heterogeneous skill endowments would then require G00
vw < 0.
Let ￿ denote the marginal social cost of public funds E. For a given tax function T (:), we
denote gw (respectively g0) the (average and endogenous) marginal social weight associated with






v (Uw ￿ ￿;w;￿) ￿ U0
C (Cw;Yw;w)
￿








v (U (b;0;w);w;￿) ￿ U0
C (b;0;w)
￿
j￿ > Uw ￿ U (b;0;w)
￿
(16)
The government values an additional dollar to the h(w) employed individuals of skill w (to the
1￿H (w1) nonemployed) as gw times h(w) dollars (g0 times 1￿H (w1) dollars). The government
thus wishes to transfer income from individuals whose social weight is below 1 to those whose
social weight is above 1. As will be made clear below, g0 and the shape of the marginal social
weights w 7! gw entirely summarize how the government￿ s preferences in￿ uence the optimal tax
policy. The only properties we have are that g0 and gw are positive. In particular, the shape
of w 7! gw can be non-monotonic, decreasing or increasing and we can have g0 above or below
gw0. However, a government that has a redistributive motive would typically adopt a decreasing
shape w 7! gw of social welfare weights, as discussed in Section IV.
10III Optimal marginal tax rates
III.1 Derivation of the optimal marginal tax formula
The government￿ s problem consists in ￿nding a nonlinear income tax schedule T (:) and a welfare
bene￿t b to maximize the social objective (14), subject to the budget constraint (13) and the
labor supply decisions along both margins. In this section, we directly derive the optimal tax
formula through small perturbations of the optimal tax function. Following Mirrlees (1971),
Appendix B solves the government￿ s problem in terms of incentive-compatible allocations, using
optimal control techniques and veri￿es that both methods lead to the same optimal tax formulae.
Proposition 1 The optimal tax policy must verify
T0 (Yw)
1 ￿ T0 (Yw)
= A(w) ￿ B(w) ￿ C (w) (17)















￿n ￿ T0 (Yn) + ￿n ￿ (T (Yn) + b)
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w f1 ￿ gn ￿ ￿n ￿ T0 (Yn) ￿ ￿n (T (Yn) + b)g ￿ h(n) ￿ dn
H (w1) ￿ H (w)
Equation (17) summarizes the trade-o⁄ underlying the choice of the marginal tax rate at
earnings level Yw. We consider the e⁄ects of an in￿nitesimal perturbation of the tax function as
depicted in the left hand-side panel of Figure 2. Marginal tax rates are uniformly decreased by
an amount ￿ over a range of earnings [Yw ￿ ￿;Yw]. Therefore, the tax levels uniformly decrease
by an amount ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ for all skill levels n above w. This tax reform has four (￿rst-order)
e⁄ects: a substitution e⁄ect for taxpayers whose earnings before the reform are in [Yw ￿ ￿;Yw],
and some mechanical, income and participation e⁄ects for taxpayers with skill n above w.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Substitution e⁄ect The substitution e⁄ect takes place on the range of gross earnings [Yw ￿ ￿;Yw].
The mass of workers a⁄ected by the substitution e⁄ect is ^ h(Yw)￿￿. For these workers, according




1 ￿ T0 (Yw)
￿ ￿
11The tax reform has only a second-order e⁄ect on Uw and thereby on the participation decision
and its contribution to the government objective. However, the rise in earnings increases the




1 ￿ T0 (Yw)
￿ "w ￿ Yw ￿ ^ h(Yw) ￿ ￿ (20)
Workers of skill n above w face a reduction ￿ in their tax level with no change in the marginal
tax rate. This has three consequences.
Mechanical e⁄ects First, in the absence of any behavioral response from these workers, the
government gets ￿ units of tax receipts less from each of the h(n) workers of skill n. However,
the tax reduction induces a higher consumption level Cn, which is valued gn by the government.




(1 ￿ gn) ￿ h(n) ￿ dn ￿ ￿ (21)
Income e⁄ects Second, the tax reduction induces each of the workers of skill n to change her
intensive choice by ￿Yn = ￿n ￿ ￿ (see Equation (10)). This income response has only a ￿rst-
order e⁄ect on the government￿ s budget: each of the h(n) workers of skill n pays T0 (Yn) ￿ ￿Yn




￿n ￿ T0 (Yn) ￿ h(n) ￿ dn ￿ ￿ (22)
Participation e⁄ects Finally, the reduction in tax levels induces ￿n ￿ h(n) ￿ ￿ individuals of
skill n to enter employment (see Equation (11)). The change in participation decisions then has
only a ￿rst-order e⁄ect on the government￿ s budget. Each additional worker of skill n pays T (n)





￿n ￿ (T (Yn) + b) ￿ h(n) ￿ dn ￿ ￿ (23)
The sum of Sw, Mw, Iw and Pw should be zero if the original tax function is optimal.
Rearranging terms then gives:
T0 (Yw)






w f1 ￿ gn ￿ ￿n ￿ T0 (Yn) ￿ ￿n (T (Yn) + b)g ￿ h(n) ￿ dn
Yw ￿ ^ h(Yw)
(24)
which gives (17) because of (8).
Equation (18) describes the e⁄ects of providing a uniform transfer ￿ to all employed individ-
uals. This tax perturbation does not a⁄ect marginal tax rates, so it only induces the mechanical,
income and participation e⁄ects. The sum of (21), (22) and (23) evaluated for w = w0 should
12be nil at the optimum, which leads to (18). Equations (17) and (18) imply that the optimal
marginal tax rate is nil at the minimum earnings level.15
To grasp the intuition behind Equation (19), consider an increase by ￿ in the welfare bene￿t
b and a unit lump-sum decrease by ￿ in the tax function for all skill levels. This reform changes
neither the marginal nor the participation tax rates. Hence, it has only mechanical and income
e⁄ects along the intensive and extensive margins. This reform induces a (mechanical) loss of





w0 h(n) ￿ dn
￿
￿￿ for the nonemployed and
R w1
w0 gn￿h(n)￿dn￿￿ for workers.
Therefore, the mechanical e⁄ect corresponds to the left-hand side of (19). The right-hand side
captures the income e⁄ects along both margins.16 First, through the income response along the
intensive margin, earnings change by ￿Yn = ￿n ￿ ￿. This a⁄ects tax revenues by the weighted
integral of ￿Yn ￿ T0 (Yn) = ￿n ￿ T0 (Yn) ￿ ￿. Second, participation decisions change through the
income e⁄ect by ￿h(n) = ￿n ￿ h(n) ￿ ￿ (See Equation (12)). Given that for each additional
worker of skill n, tax revenues increase by T (Yn)+b, the total impact is the weighted integral of
￿n ￿(T (Yn) + b)￿￿. In the normal case, ￿n < 0 and ￿n < 0. Therefore, as T (Yn)+b is typically
positive for most workers, we expect that larger income e⁄ects along both margins increase the
average of the social welfare weights (g0 and gn￿ s) above 1.
III.2 Comparison with the optimal tax literature
Equation (17) decomposes the determinants of the optimal marginal tax rates into three com-
ponents. A(w) is the e¢ ciency term. B(w) captures the role of the skill distribution among
employed individuals. Finally, C (w) stands for the social preferences for income redistribution,
taking into account the induced responses through income e⁄ects and along the participation
margin.
There are two apparent di⁄erences between our formulation of the e¢ ciency term A(w) and
that in the literature. The ￿rst is the presence of T00 (Yw) in the de￿nitions (7) and (9) of ￿w
and "w. This is because of our de￿nitions of behavioral responses along a potentially nonlinear
income tax schedule and the induced endogeneity of marginal tax rates. However, in the ratio
￿w="w, these additional terms cancel out. Consequently, the term A(w) is the same whether
we de￿ne behavioral elasticities ￿w and "w along the optimal tax schedule (as in the present
study) or along a ￿virtual￿linear tax schedule (as common in the literature; see, e.g., Piketty
15Intuitively, increasing the marginal tax rate at a skill level w
0 improves equity when the extra tax revenue can
be redistributed towards a positive mass of people with skill levels less than or equal to w
0. Given that the mass
of agents with a skill level less than or equal to w0 is nil, a positive marginal tax rate at w0 does not improve
equity. It does, however, distort the labor supply. The optimal marginal tax rate at the lowest skill level then
equals zero. This result no longer holds if there is bunching at the bottom of skill distribution (Seade (1977)).
16Diamond (1975), Sandmo (1998) and Jacobs (2010) emphasize that the social value of public funds should
only take into account the behavioral responses from the income e⁄ects. Equation (19) shows that only income
e⁄ects along the intensive ￿w and extensive ￿w margins matter.
13(1997), Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001)). The second di⁄erence is induced by our assumption
on preferences (1). The literature typically imposes that preferences over consumption and in-
work e⁄ort do not vary with the skill level, and are described by U(C;Y=w). Then, it happens
that the numerator of A(w) coincides with one plus the uncompensated elasticity of the labor
supply. This is counterintuitive, as it suggests that ceteris paribus marginal tax rates increase
with the latter elasticity. Our more general assumption on preferences enables us to stress that
what matters is the elasticity ￿w of earnings with respect to the skill level. Marginal tax rates
are inversely related to the compensated elasticity "w, in the vein of the Ramsey￿ s ￿inverse
elasticity￿ rule.
The term B(w) captures the role of the skill distribution. Consider an increase in the
marginal tax rate around the earnings level Yw (the left hand-side of Figure 2). The induced
distortions along the intensive margin is proportional to the product of the skill level w times
the number of workers at that skill level, w ￿ h(w) (Atkinson (1990)). However, the gain in tax
revenues is proportional to the number H (w1)￿H (w) of employed individuals of skill n above
w. Two di⁄erences with the literature are worth noting. First, because of the extensive margin
responses, what matters is the distribution of skills among employed individuals, instead of the
one over the entire population. Given that h(w)=f (w) equals the employment rate of workers
of skill w and (H (w1) ￿ H (w))=(1 ￿ F (w)) equals the aggregate employment rate above skill
w, one can further decompose B(w) into its exogenous and endogenous components:
B(w) =
1 ￿ F (w)






The ￿rst term on the right-hand side equals the exogenous skill distribution term of Diamond
(1998).17 Second, the distribution term in (Saez (2001), Equation (19)) concerns the virtual
distribution of earnings and not the skill distribution. This is how Saez (2001) removes the
counterintuitive presence of the uncompensated labor supply elasticity in the numerator of his ef-
￿ciency term. Using (8), one then obtains that ￿wB(w) =
￿




Yw ￿ ^ h(Yw)
￿
,
so our optimal tax formula can also be expressed in terms of the earnings distribution, as in
(24). Both formulations have their advantage. The earnings distribution has the advantage that
earnings are directly observable. However, earnings are endogenous, and hence the observed
and optimal earnings distributions may di⁄er. To compute optimal tax rates, one then has to
specify the utility function. Once this is done, the individual￿ s ￿rst-order condition (5) enables
us to recover the individual￿ s skill level w from her observed earnings Y (and from knowledge
of the tax function). Accordingly, the advantage of the formulation in terms of the earnings
distribution disappears. Nevertheless, we present both formulations and leave it to interested
readers to choose the one they prefer.
17Diamond￿ s (1998) C (w) corresponds to our B(w) and vice versa.
14The term C (w) captures the in￿ uence of social preferences for income redistribution, taking
into account the induced responses through income e⁄ects and along the participation margin.
C (w) equals the average of mechanical, income and participation e⁄ects for all workers of skill
n above w. Diamond (1998) considers the case where participation is exogenous and there is no
income e⁄ect. Introducing income e⁄ects or participation responses in the analysis then amounts
to modifying the social weight to:
￿ gn
def
￿ gn + ￿n ￿ (T (Yn) + b) + ￿n ￿ T0 (Yn)
Saez (2002, p. 1055) has explained why the government is more willing to transfer income to
groups of employed individuals for which the participation response ￿n or the participation tax
T (Yn)+b is larger. The behavioral parameter ￿n is positive, so a decrease in the level of tax paid
by workers of skill n induces more of them to work. Whenever the participation tax T (Yn)+b is
positive, tax revenues increase, which is bene￿cial to the social planner. A similar interpretation
can be made for the income e⁄ect. Typically, leisure is a normal good (hence ￿n < 0). Then,
through the income e⁄ect, a decrease in the level of tax paid by workers of skill n induces them
to work less through the income e⁄ect. Whenever workers face a positive marginal tax rate,
this response decreases the tax they pay, which is detrimental to the government. Therefore,
the government is more willing to transfer income to groups of employed individuals with either
lower income e⁄ects (i.e. higher ￿n) or lower marginal tax rates (Saez (2001)).
IV Properties of the second-best optimum
IV.1 Su¢ cient condition for nonnegative marginal tax rates
We ￿rst consider the special case where the labor supply decisions take place only along the
extensive margin, as assumed in Diamond (1980) and ChonØ and Laroque (2005, 2009a), so





The optimal level of tax then trades o⁄ the mechanical e⁄ect (captured by the social weight gw)
and the participation response e⁄ect (captured by the participation response ￿w) of a rise in the
level of tax. Marginal tax rates are then everywhere nonnegative if along the optimal allocation,
the function Y 7! (1 ￿ gw)=￿w is increasing. The following Proposition shows that this result
remains valid in the presence of responses along the intensive margin.
18In the absence of a response along the intensive margin, substitution e⁄ects Sw in (20) and income e⁄ects
Iw in (22) are nil at each skill level. Therefore, the sums of the mechanical Mw and the participation Pw e⁄ects
must be nil at each skill level, which gives (25).
15Proposition 2 If along the optimal allocation, w 7!
1￿gw
￿w is increasing, marginal tax rates
are always nonnegative. Furthermore, they are almost everywhere positive, except at the two
extremities Yw0 and Yw1.
This Proposition is proved in Appendix C. The intuition is illustrated in the right hand-side
panel of Figure 2. This ￿gure depicts the level of the participation tax T (Yw) + b paid by a
worker of skill w, as a function of her skill level. When labor supply responses are only along the
extensive margin, the optimal tax schedule is represented by the dashed curve. This corresponds
to the optimal trade-o⁄ between the mechanical and participation e⁄ects. If w 7! (1 ￿ gw)=￿w
is increasing in w, this function is increasing in the skill level. However, when workers can also
decide along their intensive margin, the increasing tax function and its positive marginal tax
rates induce distortions of the intensive choices. Hence, the optimal tax function depicted by the
solid curve is ￿ atter than the optimal curve without an intensive margin to limit the distortions
along the intensive margin. It also has to be as close as possible to the optimal curve without
intensive margin to limit the departures from the optimal trade-o⁄ between the participation
and mechanical e⁄ects.
Proposition 3 If along the optimal allocation, w 7!
1￿gw
￿w is increasing and if gw0 ￿ 1 for all
skill levels, then the in-work bene￿ts (if any) are smaller than the welfare bene￿t b.
This Proposition is proved in Appendix D. The assumption that gw ￿ 1 for all skills is
restrictive as it implies that in the case without intensive responses, the optimal tax is charac-
terized by providing the least-skilled workers with a lower bene￿t than the nonemployed (hence,
a Negative Income Tax is optimal). This result remains valid in the presence of intensive re-
sponses as the optimal tax function under unobserved skills is ￿ atter than that under observed
skills. Proposition 3 emphasizes this result.
In the absence of behavioral responses along the intensive margin, in-work bene￿ts for the
working poor (of skill w0) are larger than the welfare bene￿ts if and only if gw0 > 1. By
continuity, as long as the compensated elasticity (along the intensive margin) "w0 is su¢ ciently
small, in-work bene￿ts should remain higher than welfare bene￿ts; hence, an EITC is optimal,
as already stressed by Saez (2002).
In sum, according to Proposition 2 (Proposition 3) the restrictions on primitives that ensures
positive marginal (marginal and participation) tax rates in the model with extensive margin only
also guarantee positive marginal (marginal and participation) tax rates in the model with both
intensive and extensive margins.
16IV.2 Examples
The su¢ cient condition in Propositions 2 and 3 depends on the patterns of social weights gw
and extensive behavioral responses ￿w, both of which are endogenous. This subsection provides
examples where the primitives of the model guarantee the su¢ cient conditions in Propositions
2 and 3.
Our ￿rst example speci￿es the primitives of the model in such a way that gw and ￿w become
exogenous. For this purpose, individuals￿preferences are quasilinear: U (C;Y;w) = C ￿V (Y;w)
with V0
Y ;V00
Y Y > 0 > V00
Y w. The marginal utility of consumption U0
C (C;Y;w) is then always equal
to one. Moreover, we specify the distribution of the disutility of participation ￿ conditional on
any skill level w as K (￿;w) = exp(aw + ￿ ￿ ￿), where aw is a skill-speci￿c parameter adjusted to
keep some individuals out-of-the labor force at the optimum. Then, according to Equation (11),
￿w is always equal to parameter ￿ and thereby constant along the skill distribution. Finally, the
social objective is linear in utility levels with skill-speci￿c weights ￿w. Given that the speci￿-
cation of the individuals￿utility rules out income e⁄ects, we have gw = ￿w=
R w1
w0 ￿nf (n)dn (see
(15), (16) and (19)). Therefore, under redistributive social preferences, w 7! ￿w is decreasing,
so (1 ￿ gw)=￿w is decreasing. The marginal tax rates are then nonnegative according to Propo-
sition 2. Note that in this example, gw0 is necessarily strictly greater than one, so the optimal
participation tax may be negative at the bottom. A negative participation tax at the bottom is
nevertheless consistent with nonnegative marginal tax rates over the entire income distribution
as we assume a positive lower bound for the skill distribution. Hence, the lowest earnings level
is positive and the tax function can jump between Y = 0 and Yw0.
This ￿rst example is very speci￿c. In general, we consider that it is plausible that w 7! 1￿gw
is nonincreasing and w 7! ￿w is strictly decreasing. First, a redistributive government typ-
ically places a higher social welfare weight on the consumption of the least-skilled workers.
Second, there is some empirical evidence that the elasticity of participation, which equals
(Yw ￿ T(Yw) ￿ b)￿w, is typically a nonincreasing function (see, e.g., Juhn et alii (1991), Im-
mervoll et alii (2007) or Meghir and Phillips (2008)). Given that consumption Yw ￿ T (Yw) is
an increasing function, one could expect ￿w to decrease along the skill distribution.
We now provide more general speci￿cations of the primitives where w 7! 1￿gw is nonincreas-
ing and w 7! ￿w is strictly decreasing. Assume that the utility function is additively separable,
i.e.:




Y Y > 0 > u00
CC;V00
Y w. The additive separability restriction is only made for
technical convenience. However, showing within the pure intensive model that marginal tax
rates are positive without imposing the additive separability assumption (26) was a real issue
(see, e.g., Sadka 1976, Seade 1982, Werning 2000). We add another restriction on preferences.
17For an employed individual, the more skilled the worker, the lower the e⁄ort to obtain a given
earnings level. However, for the nonemployed, no e⁄ort is supplied. Hence, a larger skill does









As a result, the skill-speci￿c threshold Uw ￿ U (b;0;w) of ￿ above which an individual of type
(w;￿) chooses not to participate is an increasing function of the skill level (See Equation (31)
in Appendix B). The following properties are shown in Appendix E.
Property 1 If K (￿;w) is strictly log-concave with respect to ￿, if w 7! k(￿;w)=K (￿;w) is
nonincreasing in w and if (26)-(27) hold, then the function w 7! ￿w is strictly decreasing.
The log-concavity of K (:;w) is a property veri￿ed by many distributions commonly used. It
is equivalent to assuming that k(￿;w)=K (￿;w) is decreasing in ￿. That k(￿;w)=K (￿;w) is
nonincreasing in w encompasses the benchmark case where w and ￿ are independently distrib-
uted.
Property 2 Under either Maximin or Benthamite social preferences and (26)-(27), the function
w 7! gw is nonincreasing
Maximin (i.e., maximizing U (b;0;w)) and Benthamite (i.e., G(Uw ￿ ￿;w;￿) ￿ Uw ￿ ￿)
social preferences are polar speci￿cations. Combining Properties 1 and 2, the relation w 7!
(1 ￿ gw)=￿w can be decreasing only if gw is higher than 1. Such con￿guration can only occur
at the bottom end of the skill distribution and is ruled out under Maximin social preferences. If
instead gw0 ￿ 1, w 7! (1 ￿ gw)=￿w is increasing, so the su¢ cient condition for positive marginal
tax rates given in Proposition 2 holds. Therefore, Propositions 2 and 3 hold under the joint
following assumptions: Maximin social objective, the utility functions veri￿es (26) and (27),
K (￿;w) is strictly log-concave with respect to ￿ and k(￿;w)=K (￿;w) is nonincreasing in w.
Moreover, if the government is instead Benthamite and if gw0 ￿ 1, then Propositions 2 and 3
are again ensured.
V Numerical simulations for the U.S.
This section implements our optimal tax formula on U.S data. This exercise allows us to check
whether our su¢ cient condition for nonnegative marginal tax rates is empirically reasonable.
It also highlights the quantitative impact of the extensive margin on the optimal marginal and
participation tax rates.
18V.1 Calibration
To calibrate the model, we need to specify social and individual preferences and the distribution
of characteristics (w;￿). We consider Benthamite and Maximin social preferences. We select
a speci￿cation of individual preferences that enables us to control behavioral responses along
the intensive margin. Following Diamond (1998) and Saez (2002), we assume away income
e⁄ects along the intensive margin (hence ￿w ￿ 0) and assume the compensated elasticities to be
constantly equal to " along a linear tax schedule. Moreover, individuals￿preferences are concave











The parameter " corresponds to the compensated elasticity of earnings with respect to one
minus the marginal tax rate along a linear tax schedule (see Equation (9)), while parameter ￿
drives the redistributive preferences of a Benthamite government. Saez et alii (2010) survey the
recent literature estimating the elasticity of earnings to one minus the marginal tax rate. They
conclude that ￿the best available estimates range from 0:12 to 0:4￿ in the U.S. We take a central
value of " = 0:25 for our benchmark. For the concavity of preferences, we take ￿ = 0:8 in the
benchmark case. We conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to both of these parameters.
To calibrate the skill distribution, we employ the earnings distribution in the Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) for May 2007.19 We use the ￿rst-order condition (5) of the intensive program
to infer the skill level from each observation of earnings. We consider only single individuals to
avoid the complexity of interrelated labor supply decisions within families. Using the OECD
tax database, the real tax schedule of singles without dependent children is well approximated
by a linear tax function at rate 27:9% with an intercept of ￿$4;024:9 on an annual basis. We
use a quadratic kernel with a bandwidth of $3;822 to smooth h(w). High-income earners are
underrepresented in the CPS. Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) argue that the skill distribution
actually exhibits a fat upper tail in the U.S., which has dramatic consequences on the shape
of optimal marginal tax rates. We therefore expand (in a continuously di⁄erentiable way) our
kernel estimation by taking a Pareto distribution, with an index20 a = 2 for skill levels between
w = $20;374 and w1 = $40;748. This represents only the top 3:1% of our approximation of
the skill distribution. The lower bound of the skill distribution is w0 = $202. Figure 3 depicts
the calibrated density distribution f(w) in solid line. The dashed line is the smoothed density
distribution using the quadratic kernel and the solid line is the smoothed density after expansion
by the Pareto distribution.
19We multiply by 52 the weekly earnings given by the CPS survey.
20An (untruncated) Pareto distribution with Pareto index a > 1 is such that Pr(w > b w) = C=b w
a with a;C 2 R
+
0 .
19Insert Figure 3 about here.
One needs to calibrate the conditional distribution of ￿. Because the participation deci-
sion is dichotomous, we must specify a functional form. We choose a logistic and skill-speci￿c
speci￿cation:
K (￿;w) =
exp(￿aw + ￿w ￿)
1 + exp(￿aw + ￿w ￿)
which ensures that skill-speci￿c employment rates are always between 0 and 1. Parameters aw
and ￿w are calibrated to obtain empirically plausible skill-speci￿c employment rates, denoted
by Lw, and elasticities of employment rates with respect to the di⁄erence in disposable incomes
Cw ￿ b, denoted by ￿w = (Cw ￿ b)￿w. We take:










with ￿0 = 0:5 and ￿1 = 0:1
These speci￿cations are consistent with the empirical evidence that the employment rate Lw
is higher for the highly skilled. The average employment rate in the current economy equals
75:3%. The elasticity ￿w is equal to 0:45 on average. Unreported simulations indicate that the
properties of the optimal tax schedule are robust with respect to changes in the w 7! Lw and
w 7! ￿w relationship.
To ￿x the value of b in the current economy, we consider the net replacement ratio of a
long-term unemployed paid 67% of the average wage before entering unemployment. As this
ratio is 9% in 2007 according to the OECD tax-bene￿t calculator,21 we set b = $2;381. Given
this calibration of the current economy, we ￿nd that the budget constraint (13) is veri￿ed only
when we set the exogenous revenue requirement to E = $6;110 per capita.
V.2 Benchmark simulations
Figure 4 plots the optimal marginal tax rates (Panel (a)) and participation tax levels (Panel (b))
as functions of earnings, under the Benthamite (solid line) and Maximin (dashed line) criteria.
We focus on annual earnings below $100;000.22
Insert Figure 4 about here.
U-shape and positive marginal tax rates
Panel (a) shows that the marginal tax rates follow the usual U-shaped pro￿le obtained
without extensive margin (Saez (2001), SalaniØ (2003)), under both criteria. All our various
sensitivity analyses point out that the U-shape pro￿le is valid. Remarkably, however, our optimal
21See http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39717906_1_1_1_1,00.html
22Income earners above $100;000 represent 3:73% and 5:66% of the population at the Benthamite optimum
and at the Maximin optimum, respectively.
20marginal tax rates are much lower than those found, without extensive margin, by Saez (2001).
Section V.3 will study the quantitative importance of the extensive margin. Under Maximin,
the marginal tax rates are higher than under the Benthamite criterion, except at the bottom
end (for Y lower than Y = $5;900).
Consistent with Proposition 2, the marginal tax rates are positive under both criteria in
Panel (a). Moreover, there is no distortion at the lower end of the earnings distribution whose
value is Yw0 = $508. Under Maximin, the latter result contrasts with the optimal positive
marginal tax rate in a model with intensive margin only (Boadway and Jacquet (2008)). In
their paper, the social objective values only the utility of employed individuals at Y = Yw0,
which explains why they do not get the no-distortion result at the bottom. Conversely, when
both extensive and intensive margins are modeled, the Maximin objective values only the utility
of the nonemployed. Panel (a) also illustrates that the absence of distortion at the bottom is
a very local property: when Y = $2;150, the marginal tax rate climbs to 60:5% (58:8%) under
Benthamite (Maximin) preferences.
EITC under Bentham and NIT under Maximin
Figure 4(b) illustrates that the participation tax levels at the bottom of the earnings dis-
tribution are typically negative under a Benthamite criterion. The optimality of a negative
participation tax on the poorest workers is usually interpreted as a case for an EITC (Saez
2002). We ￿nd b = $2;665 and ￿T (Yw0) = $9;345. Contrastingly, Figure 4(b) also emphasizes
that the participation tax levels at the bottom of the earnings distribution are positive under
Maximin. An NIT then prevails. This is a standard result of the pure extensive margin model
(ChonØ and Laroque (2005)), which is still valid here when considering extensive and intensive
margins together (Saez (2002)). Intuitively, it is hardly desirable to transfer income to the
least-skilled workers, since their well-being does not matter under Maximin. At the Maximin
optimum, we ￿nd b = $4;190 and ￿T (Yw0) = $3;860.
Figure 5(a) describes how the negative participation tax on least-skilled workers enables
employment rates to be boosted well above their values in the current economy under Benthamite
social preferences. Moreover, Panel (b) illustrates how these negative participation tax rates (in
the Bentham economy) increase the gross utility levels Uw of low-skilled workers signi￿cantly
beyond their values in the current economy.
Insert Figure 5 about here.
V.3 Importance of the Extensive Margin
This section illustrates the major role played by the extensive margin. We compare how di⁄erent
are the optimal tax schedules with and without taking the extensive margin into account, while
21the distribution of skills and the number of nonemployed are exogenously kept at their calibrated
levels.
Insert Figure 6 about here.
Figure 6(a) shows that canceling the extensive margin substantially increases the marginal
tax rates. To quantify this change, we compute the mean of marginal tax rates between 0 and
$100;000, weighted by the density of employed workers. This mean increases by 11:3 percentage
points under Bentham and by 36:5 percentage points under Maximin. This is expected from
Equation (17) and the C (w) term where ￿n is set equal to zero.23 As expected as well, the
optimal marginal tax rate at the lower bound is strictly positive (and very high) under Maximin
when the extensive margin is neglected.24 Figure (6b) shows that under Benthamite preferences,
the participation tax becomes positive at the bottom of the earnings distribution when the
extensive margin is shut down.
V.4 Sensitivity analysis
As illustrated in Figure 7(a), a rise in the parameter ￿ increases the aversion to inequality and
this leads to a rise in marginal tax rates. Panel b shows that the optimal participation tax at the
low end of the earnings distribution evolves ambiguously with ￿. Intuitively participation taxes
at the bottom are lower when the welfare weight on the least skilled workers gw0 becomes very
important. However, with a very high aversion to inequality, the welfare of the nonemployed
becomes dominant and gw0 decreases.
Insert Figure 7 about here.
Figure 8(a) illustrates that the marginal tax rates decrease with the elasticity of earnings
", as theoretically expected from the implied decrease of A(w) in Equation (17). Figure 8(a)
illustrates this result with " equal to 0:25 and 0:5, under Maximin and Benthamite preferences.
The only exception is under Maximin for earnings below $5;249. Figure 8(b) emphasizes that
participation taxes decrease (increase) with " for earnings above (below) roughly around $30;000,
under both criteria.
Insert Figure 8 about here.
23Our simulations also take into account the changes in welfare weights gn in (17).
24In the absence of the extensive margin, the participation tax at the bottom end is adjusted so that the welfare
of the nonemployed is identical to the one of the least skilled worker. Consequently, there is a positive mass of
welfare weights attached to these workers and the Boadway and Jacquet (2008)￿ s argument for positive marginal
tax rate at the bottom applies.
22The following properties appear robust across these sensitivity analyses: marginal tax rates
are positive and U-shaped; participation taxes are positive under Maximin; participation taxes
are negative at the bottom of the earnings distribution under the Benthamite criterion; there is
no bunching. Our su¢ cient condition for positive marginal tax rates also appears robust, except
when the elasticity of earnings " is at least 0:5. The su¢ cient condition is then violated over
a very small interval at the bottom of the skill distribution. However, the marginal tax rates
remain positive.
VI Conclusion
This paper explored the optimal income tax schedule when labor supply responds simultaneously
along both the extensive and intensive margins. Individuals are heterogeneous across two di-
mensions: their skill and their disutility of participation. We derived a mild su¢ cient condition
for nonnegative marginal tax rates over the entire skill distribution. This condition is derived
using a new method to sign distortions (along the intensive margin) in screening models with
random participation. Our exercise illustrated that at the optimum, negative participation tax
rates can coexist with positive marginal tax rates everywhere.
Using U.S. data, we implemented our optimal tax formula. This exercise emphasized that the
optimal tax schedule is U-shaped as in the literature without an extensive margin. However, in-
troducing the extensive margin quite substantially reduces the marginal tax rates. Interestingly,
the marginal tax rates are always positive in our simulations.
The work undertaken in this study identi￿es several possible extensions. Among them,
the method to sign distortion along the intensive margin can be applied to other contexts
of monopoly screening with random participation ￿ la Rochet and Stole (2002). Moreover, we
ignored the interactions in labor supply decisions within couples (Kreiner et alii (2009)). Finally,








1 ￿ T0 (Y ) + ￿
￿
￿ U0
C (Y ￿ T (Y ) + ￿ (Y ￿ Yw) + ￿;Y;w)
+U0
Y (Y ￿ T (Y ) + ￿ (Y ￿ Yw) + ￿;Y;w)
23The ￿rst-order condition (5) is equivalent to Y (Yw;w;0;0) = 0. When T (:) is twice-di⁄erentiable,
one has (using (5)):
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The second-order condition is Y0
Y (Yw;w;0;0) ￿ 0, which gives (6). When this condition holds
with strict inequality, and when the global maximum in Y of U (Y ￿ T (Y );Y;w) is unique, we
can apply the implicit function theorem to Y (Yw;w;0;0). Provided that the sizes of the changes
in w, ￿ and ￿ are small enough for the maximum of Y 7! U (Y ￿ T (Y );Y;w) to change only
marginally, one has for x = w;￿;￿, that @Y=@x = ￿Y0
x=Y0
Y evaluated at (Yw;w;0;0). This leads
directly to (7), (9) and (10).
We now make the link between our de￿nitions of behavioral elasticities and the elasticities
along a linear tax schedule used in Saez (2001). We denote the latter with a tilde. Rewriting
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Consider now a uniform decrease ￿ of marginal tax rates (respectively a rise ￿ of the level of
tax, a rise ￿w in skill). Such a ￿reform￿has a ￿rst impact on earnings ￿1Yw that equals:
￿1Yw = ~ "w ￿
Yw
1 ￿ T0 (Yw)




which in turn implies a change in marginal tax rates of ￿T00 (Yw) ￿ ￿1Yw. Hence, the reform
has a second impact on earnings that equals:
￿2Yw = ￿~ "w ￿
Yw
1 ￿ T0 (Yw)
￿ T00 (Yw) ￿ ￿1Yw
This ￿circular process￿ takes place in￿nitely, with the nth impact on earnings being linked to the
(n ￿ 1)
th impact through:
￿nYw = ￿~ "w ￿
Yw
1 ￿ T0 (Yw)
￿ T00 (Yw) ￿ ￿n￿1Yw





1 + ~ "w ￿ Yw
1￿T0(Yw) ￿ T00 (Yw)
￿















1 + ~ "w ￿ Yw
1￿T0(Yw) ￿ T00 (Yw)
24Using (5) and (29), one retrieves (9), (10) and (7).
B The government￿ s optimum
This appendix solves the government￿ s problem in terms of allocation, as in Mirrlees (1971), and
considers the possibility of bunching. Using the obtained government￿ s optimality conditions,
we show the equivalence between this formulation and the optimal tax formula of Proposition
1.
According to the taxation principle (Hammond 1979, Rochet 1985 and Guesnerie 1995), the
set of allocations induced by the tax function T (:) corresponds to the set of incentive-compatible
allocations fYw;Cw;Uwgw2[w0;w1] that verify:
8(w;x) 2 [w0;w1]
2 Uw ￿ U (Cw;Yw;w) ￿ U (Cx;Yx;w) (30)
The incentive-compatible restrictions (30) impose the condition that when taking their intensive
decisions, workers of skill w prefer the bundle (Cw;Yw) designed for them rather then the bundle
(Cx;Yx) designed for workers of any other skill level x. We assume that w 7! Yw is continuous
on [w0;w1] and di⁄erentiable everywhere, except for a ￿nite number of skill levels. Finally,
w 7! Uw is di⁄erentiable. Hence, w 7! Cw is also continuous everywhere and di⁄erentiable
almost everywhere. These assumptions are made for reasons of tractability and have been
standard since Guesnerie and La⁄ont (1984).25
From Equation (2), the strict single-crossing condition holds. Hence, constraints (30) are




and the monotonicity requirement that the earnings level Yw be a nondecreasing function of the
skill level w. We obtain:
Lemma 1 The necessary conditions for the government￿ s problem are:26







































For all skill levels:
￿ _ Zw =




￿ (T (Yw) + b) ￿ h0
U (w) (34)







(1 ￿ g0) =
Z w1
w0
(Yw ￿ Cw + b) ￿ h0
b (w) ￿ dw (35)
25Hellwig (2008) explains how the same ￿rst-order conditions can be obtained under weaker assumptions on
w 7! Yw and w 7! Uw.
26where the various derivatives of U are evaluated at (Cw;Yw;w).
25Proof. Given that U (:;:;:) is increasing in C, we de￿ne Cw as function ￿(Uw;Yw;w) such that



















where the functions are evaluated at (w;C = ￿(u;Y;w);u = U (C;Y;w);Y ), Next, we rewrite






















where the functions are evaluated at (w;Cw;Uw;Yw). We consider Yw as the control variable
and Uw as the state variable. Then ￿ equals the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget











G(U (b;0;w);w;￿) ￿ k(￿;w) ￿ d￿ ￿ f (w) ￿ ￿ ￿ (b + E) ￿ f (w)
+￿[Yw ￿ ￿(Uw;Yw;w) + b] ￿ h(w) + qw ￿ ￿(Uw;Yw;w)
The ￿rst-order conditions of the government￿ s program are:









￿ h + qw ￿ ￿0
Y
Using Zw = ￿qw=￿, (36) and (37) leads to (32).
￿ If there is bunching over [w;w], one must have
R w
w @H=@Y (Yw;Uw;qw;w;￿)￿dw = 0. Using
again Zw = ￿qw=￿ (36) and (37) gives (33).
￿ The transversality conditions are qw0 = qw1 = 0 and, for any skill level where w 7! Yw is
continuous, one obtains ￿_ qw = @H=@U (Yw;Uw;qw;w;￿). Using Zw = ￿qw=￿ and (15)
gives (34).
￿ Finally, the ￿rst-order condition with respect to b gives (35).
We now show how to retrieve the formula in Proposition 1. Let:




U (Ux;Yx;x) ￿ dx
￿
and Jw = Zw ￿ U0
C (Cw;Yw;w)











U (Ux;Yx;x) ￿ dx
￿
26Therefore, from (11), (34) and (37):








U (Ux;Yx;x) ￿ dx
￿
(38)
At skill levels for where there is no bunching, Equation (32) can be rewritten using (5), (28b)
and (28c) as:
T0 (Yw) ￿ h(w) = Zw ￿ Y0





Using (7), (9) (28b) and (28c) we obtain:
T0 (Yw)
1 ￿ T0 (Yw)




From (34) and (11) we obtain:





CC (Cw;Yw;w) _ Cw + U00
CY (Cw;Yw;w) ￿ _ Yw + U00
Cw (Cw;Yw;w)
o
Assume now that the tax function is everywhere di⁄erentiable and there is no bunching. Di⁄er-
entiating Cw = Yw ￿ T (Yw) and using (5) gives:












Using (28c), (28d) and again (5):






With (7), (9), (10), (28c) and (28d) :




1 ￿ T0 (Yw)
￿
Finally, using (39):
_ Jw = ￿f1 ￿ gw ￿ ￿w ￿ (T (Yw) + b)g ￿ h(w) + ￿w ￿ T0 (Yw) ￿ h(w)






dn. Using the last equation and (39) gives (17).
Equation (18) is obtained from the transversality condition Jw0 = 0. Equation (19) is obtained
by adding (35) to (18).
C Proof of Proposition 2
We return back to the case where w 7! (Cw;Yw) is continuous everywhere and di⁄erentiable
everywhere except on a ￿nite number of skill levels (so that bunching can occur on a ￿nite
number of skill intervals). Note that continuity of w 7! Yw implies that w 7! Uw is continuously
di⁄erentiable. We ￿rst show the following.
27Lemma 2 Xw (thereby Zw) is everywhere nonnegative and almost everywhere positive within
(w0;w1) whenever w 7!
1￿gw
￿w is increasing.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that Zw0 ￿ 0 for some w0 2 (w0;w1). Then Xw0 ￿ 0. Through
the continuity of w 7! Xw, and the transversality condition there exists a maximal interval
[w2;w3] where Xw ￿ 0 for all w 2 [w2;w3] and Xw2 = Xw3 = 0. Moreover, as w 7! Cw is also
continuous everywhere and di⁄erentiable almost everywhere, Xw is everywhere di⁄erentiable
with a derivative given by (38).




￿ T (Yw2) + b (40)
￿ Given Xw3 = 0 and Xw ￿ 0 in the left neighborhood of w3, one must have _ Xw3 ￿ 0. By a
symmetric reasoning, this leads to:





T (w) + b = Yw ￿ ￿(Uw;Yw;w)






































where the second equality follows (31) and (36). If there is bunching at w, then _ Yw = 0.
If there is no bunching at w, then Equation (32) applies. Condition (2) and Zw ￿ 0
then induce that w 7! Yw ￿ ￿(Uw;Yw;w) admits a nonpositive derivative. Hence, w 7!
Yw ￿ ￿(Uw;Yw;w) is weakly decreasing over [w2;w3], so:
T (Yw2) + b ￿ T (Yw3) + b (42)






This is consistent with the assumption that w 7! (1 ￿ gw)=￿w is increasing if and only if w2 = w3.
Therefore w0 = w2 = w3 and Xw0 ￿ 0 for all skill levels and Xw = 0 only pointwise.
Given that Xw (hence Zw) is nonnegative everywhere and can be nil only pointwise, then
for skill levels where there is no bunching, according to (5) and (32), the marginal tax rate is
nonnegative and can be nil only pointwise. Bunches of skills correspond to a mass point of the
earnings distribution and to an upward discontinuity in the marginal tax rates. However, the
discontinuity is between two marginal tax rates that correspond to skill levels without bunching
for which we have shown that the marginal tax rates are nonnegative.
28D Proof of Proposition 3




￿ T (Y0) + b
As gw0 ￿ 1, the left-hand side is positive, inducing that in-work bene￿t (i.e. ￿T (Y0) when
T (Y0) < 0) is lower than welfare bene￿t b. From Proposition 2, we get for any w T (Yw) + b ￿
T (Yw) + b ￿ 0.
E Proofs of Properties 1 and 2
Under (27), Uw is increasing in skill w. Then, a Maximin government values only the welfare
of the nonemployed and gw = 0 for all skill levels, which ensures property 2 for a Maximin
government.
Under (26), U0
C depends only on the consumption level. From (2), incentive-compatible con-
ditions (30) imply that w 7! Cw is nondecreasing. Therefore, as u00
CC < 0, w 7! U0
C (Cw;Yw;w)
is nondecreasing, and increasing without bunching.
Under (26) and a Benthamite government, gw simply equals U0
C (Cw;Yw;w)=￿ according to
(15), which ensures property 2 for a Benthamite government.
Under Assumption (27), one has that the threshold value Uw ￿ U (b;0;w) of ￿ below which
individuals of type (w;￿) choose to work, is decreasing in skill level w. So, when K (￿;w)
is strictly log-concave with respect to ￿ and w 7! k(￿;w)=K (￿;w) is nonincreasing in w,
then w 7! k(Uw ￿ U (b;0;w);w)=K (Uw ￿ U (b;0;w);w) is decreasing. Together with w 7!
U0
C (Cw;Yw;w) being nondecreasing, using (11) ensures that w 7! ￿w is decreasing, even in the
presence of bunching. Consequently, Property 1 is ensured.
E.1 Example 1
A Maximin government values only the welfare of the nonemployed, so gw = 0 for all skill levels
and (1 ￿ gw)=￿w = 1=￿w. As Property 1 holds, (1 ￿ gw)=￿w is therefore increasing in w and
Proposition 2 applies. Moreover, as gw = 0, Proposition 3 also applies.
E.2 Example 2
Combining Properties 1, 2 and gw ￿ 1 ensures that (1 ￿ gw)=￿w is increasing in w. As a result,
Proposition 2 applies, and thereby Proposition 3 as it has been assumed that gw ￿ 1.
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Figure 1: Tax reforms around Yw defining behavioral responses εw and αwY
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Figure 4: The simulations under the benchmark calibration
T ’(Y)
Y Y















Figure 5: Optimal allocationsFigure 6: Optimal tax schedules with and without extensive margin
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T ’(Y) T (Y) + bFigure 7: Sensitivity analysis with respect to σ for the Benthamite optimum









σ = 0.2Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis with respect to ε
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